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Abstract—With a growing increase in botnet at-
tacks, computer networks are constantly under threat
from attacks that cripple cyber-infrastructure. De-
tecting these attacks in real-time proves to be a diffi-
cult and resource intensive task. One of the pertinent
methods to detect such attacks is signature based
detection using machine learning models. This paper
explores the efficacy of these models at detecting
botnet attacks, using data captured from large-scale
network attacks. Our study provides a comprehensive
overview of performance characteristics two machine
learning models — Random Forest and Multi-Layer
Perceptron (Deep Learning) in such attack scenarios.
Using Big Data analytics, the study explores the
advantages, limitations, model/feature parameters,
and overall performance of using machine learning
in botnet attacks / communication. With insights
gained from the analysis, this work recommends algo-
rithms/models for specific attacks of botnets instead
of a generalized model.
Keywords: Botnet detection, Network Security, Machine
Learning, Ensemble Methods, Deep-Learning
I. Introduction
In an increasingly connected world of machines
where usability takes presence over security, comput-
ers/machines have become more vulnerable to exploits
by malicious entities. A large portion of such machines
are utilized for their computational and connectivity
resources to conduct synchronized attacks across net-
works. Botnets are a group of exploited machines (with
malicious software) that are leveraged for large scale
attacks across different cyber-infrastructure components
[1].
Attacks from botnets include email/message based
spam, deploying malware, executing distributed denial
of service (DDoS) attacks, and even spreading the botnet
software to more computers [2]. In Q1 2017 [1], cyber-
infrastructure resources in almost 72 countries were tar-
geted using botnets. The Federal Bureau of Investigation
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[3] reports that 18 computers per second are partici-
pating in botnets, amounting to 500 million computers
worldwide. With growing participation (maliciously ex-
ploited) of connected devices in the form of Internet-Of-
Things (IoT) in botnets [4], detection of such attacks
have been key towards securing infrastructure.
While machine learning [5] and network modelling
techniques [6] have been widely used towards detection
of botnet attacks, most of the approaches are tailored
towards detection of specific types of such attacks. The
paper explores the advantages and disadvantages of
such models in a real-world scenario. More specifically,
utilizing real network data captured across a computer
network [7], for seven different types of botnet attacks,
the paper examines the utility of different machine learn-
ing models in detecting such attacks.
Using information collected from Netflow records [8],
the approach examines the models across standard per-
formance/accuracy measures of - Precision, Recall, and
F1-Measure for attack versus non-attack records using
supervised models. The analysis removes any device/user
identifiable information from the records by using ag-
gregate statistics and does not perform any deep-packet
payload inspection. The limitations were purposely put
in place for developing efficient models capable of oper-
ating in real-time scenario with limited resources (such
as routers).
This study also aims to identify the ideal parameters
of detection of specific attacks by conducting exhaus-
tive search of parameters and features for the machine
learning models. Big Data techniques were utilized to
compute the performance characteristics of the models
using parallelization techniques. The goal is to improve
detection of botnet attacks in real-world real-time sys-
tems, where intrusion detection systems (IDS) can be
pro-active utilizing the appropriate models for detection
of attacks and eventual mitigation.
II. Background
The most common model for operating botnets is
the command and control (C&C) architecture [9]. The
controller is a master who issues commands for the
distributed architecture of bots through legitimate In-
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ternet Relay Chat (IRC) channels. The predominant
detection methods for botnets are based on analyzing
communication/traffic streams. They include statistical
approaches, where anomaly detection [10] is utilized for
identifying abnormal activity related to botnets. More
recently, machine learning methods [11] have been used
to classify network traffic (normal/attack). Livadas et
al. [12] utilized multi-stage Bayesian network classifiers
to detect botnets, where the first stage is utilized to
characterize IRC traffic, and the second for botnet com-
munication. Saad et. al. [13] compared the performance
of five different supervised machine learning algorithms
to detect P2P botnet attacks. The BClus methods pro-
posed by Garcia et. al. [14], are a unique approach
towards utilizing unsupervised clustering algorithms to
annotate botnet attacks. Supervised machine-learning
approaches such Random Forest [15] and Deep-Learning
[16] models have been explored by various studies es-
tablishing their effectiveness in analyzing network based
communication/traffic. However, a comparative analysis
on the advantages and disadvantages of each of the
approaches has been lacking.
Id Time(hrs) #Packets #Netflows Size Bot #Bots IRC SPAM DDOS
1 6.15 71.9 M 2 M 52GB Neris 1
2 4.21 71.8 M 1.8 M 60GB Neris 1
3 66.85 167.7 M 4.7 M 121GB Rbot 1
4 4.21 62 M 1.1 M 53GB Rbot 1
5 11.63 4.4 M 1.2 M 37.6GB Viruit 1
6 5.18 115.4 M 2.7 M 94GB Neris 10
7 4.75 90.3 M 1.3 M 73GB Rbot 10
8 0.26 6.3 M 107 K 5.2GB Rbot 3
9 16.36 50.8 M 1.9 M 34GB Virut 1
Table I: Botnet Data - Netflow records of communication
A key hurdle in evaluating the capabilities of detection
models is the availability of real-world datasets. While
the NSL-KDD (KDDCUP-99) [17] has provided re-
searchers with labeled data, including Denial Of Service
(DOS), unauthorized access, remote access, and probing
attacks, it does not represent the different varieties of
attacks current botnets are capable of.
The CTU-13 dataset [14] is a comprehensive dataset
representing different scenarios of botnet attacks. The
CTU-13 dataset, was developed for a comparative mea-
sure of detection performance among various algorithms.
The dataset contains real-world network capture of thir-
teen different types of attacks conducted using different
botnets (Neris, Rbot, Virut, etc.). The dataset is in the
form of bidirectional netflow records capturing — Start
Time, End Time, Duration, Source IP address, Source
Port, Direction, Destination IP address, Destination
Port, State, SToS, Total Packets and Total Bytes of each
connection in the network.
For comparative measure of detection performance in
different scenarios of botnet attacks, the records have
been labeled with — Normal, Background, C&C, and
Botnet flows. The dataset represents a multitude of char-
acteristics of botnet attacks and their communications.
Table I, denotes the different types of communication
and attack characteristics which covers SPAM and DDoS
attacks, and IRC communication. As a result the dataset
provides for an excellent opportunity to study and com-
pare the abilities of different machine learning models in
detecting the different characteristics of the attacks.
III. Approach
Utilization of machine learning models in detecting
botnet operation in a network can be categorized into
two generalized approaches — 1) Payload, and 2) Traffic
based. As the name suggests, the payload based ap-
proach trains models based on features extracted from
the payload / data component of the packets transmitted
across the network. The drawbacks of such a models
are the resource intensive nature (where every packet
has to be analyzed for features), issues with privacy,
and encrypted data (features cannot be extracted). The
traffic based approach aims at alleviating some of the
drawbacks of the model by analyzing the packet headers
or Netflow records of communication. While privacy is
still a concern with such an approach (such as individual
IP addresses in features), this can be mitigated by using
aggregation of records for time windows.
Our approach utilizes the temporal domain of the Net-
flow records by developing features for time-windows in a
network. We develop aggregated features for time dura-
tions/windows which are then utilized to train machine-
learning models. For each dataset, the features of the
aggregated Netflows are calculated by taking into ac-
count all Netflows that were initiated or were continuing
(initiated in a earlier window but currently active) in
a particular window. The values of each Netflow record
which falls into either of the two categories were taken
into account for developing features of the window.
The 13 datasets were merged into 4 different cate-
gories based on the category of attack/communication
— 1) DDoS (4, 7, 8), 2) Spam (1,2,5,6,9), and 3) IRC
(1,2,3,4,6,7,8). The target label for each of the records
of the dataset were developed in the same way as
features for the time-window, considering Botnet and
C&C records as ’attack’ labels and only the normal
records as non-attack label. In other words, if a single
Netflow record in the time-window has Botnet and/or
C&C tags, the entire window is considered as an attack
window. If no records had those tags in the data, the
window is considered non-attack. Further more, multiple
datasets were created (from the merged) data using
different window sizes (0.01, 1.0, 10, 30, 60 seconds) for
aggregation and evaluation of the models.
This dataset did not use any records in the origi-
nal dataset tagged as ’background’. The goal here was
to evaluate the efficiency of the developed models on
verified records which have been identified by subject
matter expert (SME). With the best developed models
(using feature and parameter tuning) in such an scenario,
the effectiveness of the models can then be tested in
an environment where a large portion of the data is
unverified. For this propose, a secondary dataset was
developed which considered background tag into devel-
oping the time-window based features and labeling. In
this case, the background tag was assumed to be ’non-
attack’ traffic considering all of the attack traffic was
labeled by the SME in the environment.
A. Feature Extraction
The identified features of the study can broadly be
classified into two categories — 1) Extracted , and 2) An-
alyzed features. The extracted features record simplistic
observations of connections within a time-window. Most
of the features in this category are general counts (N ) or
mean (W¯) values are aggregated over connections within
a time-window. Table II, describes the various categories
of such features, where observations of 1) Connection
Information, 2) IP Address, 3) Port, and 4) Protocols
used by the Netflow records are used. Extracted features
in the connection category record counts of different
types of connection and mean duration (W¯_duration)
for each window. In the IP address category, aggregated
counts of different classes of source and destination IP
address classes are kept. Similarly, port variables record
count of utilization of different source and destination
ports above and below 1024 (below 1024 are well-known
ports). Protocols used by the connects are also kept
track of in the variables representing counts of TCP
(N_TCP), UDP (N_UDP), and ICMP (N_ICMP)
connections.
The analyzed category develops in-depth feature
transformations using the raw values recorded from each
of the netflow records (within a time-window). The
feature calculations in the category are based on either
entropy (S) or standard deviation (σ) of the features
within the time window.
Similar to the extracted features, the analyzed features
were also developed for connection information, IP ad-
dress, and port data. Connection based entropy of pack-
ets transferred (S_packets), the total number of bytes
(S_bytes), bytes from source (S_srcbytes), connection
states (S_state), and duration (S_time) were recorded
for each time window. For each of the entropy values,
standard deviations were also measured (excluding the
state entropy) - σ_packets, σ_bytes, σ_srcbytes, and
σ_time. Entropy in IP address were recorded for change
within different classes for both source and destination.
Category Feature Description
Extracted Features
Connection
Information
1. N_conn Number of connections
2. N_normal_flow Count of normal connections
3. N_back_flow Count of background connections
4. W¯_duration Mean of duration of all connection
IP Address
5. N_s_a_p_address
Count of source
IP by class
6. N_s_b_p_add
7. N_s_c_p_add
8. N_s_na_p_add
9. N_d_a_p_add
Count of destination
IP by class
10. N_d_b_p_add
11. N_d_c_p_add
12. N_d_na_p_add
Port
Information
13. N_sports>1024
Count of source ports over and below 1024
14. N_sports<1024
15. N_dports>1024
Count of destination ports over and below 1024
16. N_dports<1024
Protocol
Information
17. N_icmp
Count of protocol used18. N_tcp
19. N_udp
Analyzed Features
Connection
Information
20. S_packets Entropy - packets transferred
21. S_srcbytes Entropy - bytes from source
22 S_bytes Entropy - bytes transferred
23. S_state Entropy - connection states
24. S_time Entropy - connection duration
25. σ_time Standard deviation - duration per connection
26. σ_packets Standard deviation - packets transferred
27 σ_bytes Standard deviation - bytes transferred
28. σ_srcbytes Standard deviation - bytes from source transferred
Entropy
IP Address
29. S_srcip Entropy - source and
destination IP addresses30. S_dstip
31. S_src_a_ip
Entropy - source
IP by class
32. S_src_b_ip
33. S_src_c_ip
34. S_src_na_ip
35. S_dst_a_ip
Entropy - destination
IP by class
36. S_dst_b_ip
37. S_dst_c_ip
38. S_dst_ns_ip
39. S_src_to_dst Entropy of source to destination IPwith duration and bytes transferred
Entropy
Port
40. S_srcport Entropy - source
and destination ports41. S_dstport
42. S_sports>1024
Entropy - source ports
43. S_sports<1024
44. S_dports>1024
Entropy - destination ports
45. S_dports<1024
Table II: Extracted Features - Feature variables from the
netflow records aggregated by time window
Apart from the standard entropy calculation for the IP
addresses, S_src_to_dest was developed to map single
source to destination connections along with their con-
nection duration and amount of data transferred in each
connection. Changes in port utilization within a time-
window was also captured as entropy variables for source
and destination and utilization standard versus unknown
ports.
The final output of the feature extraction stage repre-
sents the following data:
f iv = < xi1 · · ·xi47 > : yi = li (1)
Where, f iv is the feature vector for the window i, li is
the label of the window represented by yi, where
li =
 yi : 0 if attack flows in window(i) = 0yi : 1 if attack flows in window(i) ≥ 1 (2)
B. Building Machine Learning Models
The machine learning algorithms explored in here are -
1) Random Forest and 2) Multi-Layer Perceptron (Deep
Learning). A Random forest model can be defined as
h = {h1(X), · · · , hj(X)}, where an ensemble of decision
tree classifiers (hj(X), with j trees) are used to make
collective decisions. X is the model training data of the
features vectors (f iv) and their corresponding labels (li).
Multi-Layer Perceptrons (MLP) [18], [19] use feed-
forward artificial neural networks consisting of an in-
put layer, multiple hidden layers, and an output layer.
Each layer is made up of perceptrons which compute
a single output (γ) based on a input vector defined
by γ = ϕ(
∑n
i=1 wixi + b), where w denotes the vector
of weights for the perceptron, x is input vector (either
from the actual input vector or previous layer outputs),
b being the bias, and ϕ the activation function. The
weights and biases are adjusted in the perceptrons in
each layer based on the training input vector (f iv) and
their corresponding labels (li) using back and forward
propagation.
For each of the models, the entire dataset was sepa-
rated into training data (70% of the dataset) for model
development, and test data (remaining 30%) for vali-
dation. For the Random forest, the number of estima-
tors/decision trees used in the initial model was j = 10,
maximum of 6 features per estimator, no maximum
depth for the trees, and requires two samples to split
an internal node. The MLP model, was based on 4-layer
approach, with one input, 2 hidden layers each followed
by a dropout layer of 50% dropout (to prevent overfit-
ting), and one output layer. Each layer utilizes Rectified
Linear Unit (ReLU) as its activation function ϕ, and
binary cross-entropy for the loss function. Performance
of each model was recorded for their accuracy (overall
classification), precision ( tptp+fp ), recall (
tp
tp+fn ), and F-
1 score ( 2.precision∗recallprecision+recall ), where tp is the number of
true positive classified of attack labels, fp is the number
of false positives classified on attack labels, fn is the
number of false negatives classified by the models.
Different window sizes for the feature vectors (f iv) in
the data were explored while evaluating the performance
of the model. Window sizes ranging from 0.1 all the
way with 60 second intervals were evaluated for dif-
ferent types of attacks/communication (DDoS, SPAM,
and IRC) with the deep learning and random forest
algorithms. For each of these intervals the F1-Score was
recorded for cross-evaluation. An exhaustive search was
also conducted for evaluation of hyper-parameter values
and architecture layouts which yield better performance
of detecting attack windows in the learned models. In the
random forest models, a grid search method was used,
where multiple estimators (10 - 700) were evaluated for
their performance. Other parameter values such as min-
split of leaves, max depth of the estimators, and number
of features per estimators were also evaluated for their F-
1 score. In the MLP model, multiple architectures with
different number of hidden layers, number of perceptrons
per layer, and different activation functions were tested
(Tanh, Sigmoid, LeakyReLU) were tested for their accu-
racy.
Each of the models were also run through a k-fold
cross validation (k = 10) with random selection of
training and test datasets, where the mean scores of the
models were taken into account for performance metric
comparisons.
IV. Results and Analysis
A. Initial Results
Table III describes the overall performance of the
Random Forest and Deep Learning (MLP) models. The
reported values shown in the table are for base/initial
models with single window size for all attacks (1 sec)
and default model parameters as described in Section
III-B. In the case of Multi-Layer Perceptron model,
where a binary classifier is used to predict windows with
attack/non-attack features, the resulting model is able
to perform with an overall F1-score (value between 0
- 1) of .34 in DDoS, .93 in SPAM, and .91 in IRC
data. The model performs very poorly on the DDoS
data indicated by low recall score of .26, suggesting its
inability to correctly identify attack windows. In case of
SPAM and IRC, the model is able to perform well with
good accuracy score.
In comparison, Random Forest consistently performs
well on each of the data with F1-scores of .97 in DDoS,
.99 in SPAM, and .98 in IRC data. While the accuracy
of the model is high, we can notice the performance of the
model for DDoS attack is lower when compared others.
These issues lead to a further investigation of the models
on their window sizes for each of the datasets.
B. Model/Feature Tuning
Figure 1 describes the performance (mean F1-score)
of the models in different scenarios of attacks (DDoS,
SPAM, and IRC) with different window sizes for aggrega-
tion of features. In case of DDoS, the both Random For-
est and MLP have higher F1-scores with lower window
size (in initial model was 1 sec) of 0.01 second. Increasing
the time windows to be greater than 0.01 seconds, leads
to significant degradation in DDoS detection perfor-
mance. This can be attributed to lower time duration of
individual DDoS connections, where smaller window size
Figure 1: Window Size versus F1-score: Analysis of
model performance in different window size aggregation.
will lead to accurate representation of attack features,
and in turn lead to better model performance. For the
SPAM and IRC datasets, the analysis did not show any
benefits of changing the default 1 second interval for
window sizes, instead lead to inferior performance (drops
in F1-score) at lower (0.01) and higher (10, 30, and 60
second) time windows.
Analysis of the individual model hyper-parameters did
not show any significant increase in performance in both
the algorithms. In Random Forest increase in the number
of estimators showed only 0.01 gain in model accuracy.
Similar non-significant increase in model performance
was observed in MLP, where larger networks of percep-
trons and layers were used. The models were analyzed for
the reported prediction probability values instead of just
the default to detect all attack windows. The decision
threshold of detecting attack window was decreased to
0.3 (based on the Recall scores), where window with
predicted probability of attack is 1 ≥ 0.3 is taken to
be an attack window, and in turn classifies a window to
be normal if predicted probability of 0 ≤ 0.7. While this
decreases the F-1 score of the normal windows (0), it
aims for increased accuracy in detecting attack windows
1.
C. Final metrics
Table III outlines the performance metrics of tuned
models. With the window size tuning we see improve-
ments in performance across all models (as compared to
initial values), especially in the DDoS data. The MLP
models gained a significant boost in their performance
in detecting DDoS attack from an F1-score of 0.34 in
initial models to 0.95 in 10 millisecond window size
aggregation. As a result, the combined score of the MLP
model also improves to 0.93.
In the case of Random Forest, the models perform on
nearly perfect accuracy across all types of attacks. In
the case of DDoS we observe an increase in accuracy
by 2% where F1-Score increase from 0.97 to 0.99. With
Attack
Type
Random Forest Deep learning
Accuracy - Precision - Recall - F1 Accuracy - Precision - Recall - F1
Initial Untuned Model
DDOS 0.9764 - 0.9793 - 0.9329 - 0.9708 0.7835 - 0.9837 - 0.2652 - 0.3431
SPAM 0.9905 - 0.9913 - 0.9927 - 0.9942 0.9298 - 0.9219 - 0.9586 - 0.9399
IRC 0.9862 - 0.9864 - 0.9856 - 0.9912 0.9169 - 0.9320 - 0.9027 - 0.9171
Tuned Model
DDOS 0.999 - 0.999 - 0.999 - 0.999 0.942 - 0.946 - 0.965 - 0.956
SPAM 0.993 - 0.993 - 0.996 - 0.994 0.907 - 0.962 - 0.879 - 0.918
IRC 0.992 - 0.989 - 0.995 - 0.992 0.895 - 0.925 - 0.857 - 0.889
Table III: Performance Metrics of Models: Accuracy,
Precision, Recall, and F1-score of initial/untuned versus
tuned models
Figure 2: Confusion Matrices Of Each Model On Each
Attack: Prediction matrix of Deep Learning and Random
Forest with tuned parameters.
the probability tuning, Figure 2 shows the accuracy of
Random forest in detecting attack windows with only
8 windows mis-classified as normal while getting 9,671
windows accurately detected (overall 17 windows incor-
rectly classified out of14,927 ) in training data. Similar
results were also observed in detecting SPAM and IRC
windows.
V. Discussion
A. Feature Tuning
Analysis of performance metrics observed for feature
(window) and model tuning suggests large gains in model
detection accuracy can be observed by using different
window sizes for feature aggregation. In comparison,
model hyper-parameter tuning provide negligible perfor-
mance benefits, and can in some cases lead to increase
in complexity of the underlying model. Our analysis
suggests using 0.01 sec window size for DDoS, and 1 sec
windows for SPAM and IRC, in order to get the best
performance out of the trained models. In a real-world
scenario, this would involve training multiple models
with different aggregated window size based features. A
general model which uses a single aggregation size will
not be suitable for detection of every type of attack, as
shown by our initial results.
Figure 3: Multi-Layer Perceptron & Random Forest
ROC curve: ROC curve for each attack type (tuned
model).
B. Model Performance
Based on the performance metrics of the tuned mod-
els, it can clearly be observed that Random Forest based
models outperform MLP models in detecting attack
windows in every category. This is especially highlighted
in the model Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC)
curves outlined in Figure 3. While, the Area Under the
Curve (AUC) values for MLP are above 0.90 for all types
of attacks, the model performs the worst on detection
of SPAM attacks. MLP models work well in detecting
DDoS attack windows with AUC score of 0.97, closely
followed by botnet communication detection of IRC at
0.95. In comparison, the Random Forest models perform
at near perfect accuracy with AUC scores of DDoS - 1.0,
IRC - 0.99, and SPAM - 1.0.
The relative poor performance of MLP models can
partially be attributed to the number of available train-
ing samples. MLP models (and more generally Deep
Learning) greatly benefit from large amounts of training
data and can outperform traditional models in such a
case. This was also observed in detecting DDoS attacks,
where 10 millisecond window size aggregation lead to
increased model performance. While dataset used in our
experiments were limited, in large organizations this
would note be the case, and MLP based methods can be
used for detection of attacks. In scenarios, where amount
of labeled data is limited ensemble based methods such
a Random Forests will outperform Deep-Learning based
approaches as shown by our results.
C. Feature Importance
Diving deeper into the characteristics of the Random
Forest model, Figure 4 shows the importance of top ten
features in each attack category. In the case of SPAM,
the mean duration of the connections (W¯_duration)
play an important role in detecting attacks, followed
by standard deviation of connection duration (σ_time),
entropy of destination IP address (S_time) suggesting
Figure 4: Feature Importance Random Forest - Im-
portance of features in different types of attack with
normalized scores (0 - 1)
SPAMmessages sent out to large number of destinations,
standard deviation of packets (σ_packets) - difference in
the number of packets in attack versus normal windows,
and bytes (σ_bytes) transferred within a time window
where SPAM communication will see a larger amount
transferred. While other features (feature number - 19,
21, 42, 18, 10) play a role in detection of the SPAM
based attacks they are of less significance from the top
five features.
Similarly, in IRC detection, the mean duration of
the connections (W¯_duration) again is of significant
importance followed by entropy of destination IP address
(S_destip) suggesting a controller communicating with
a large number of bots, standard deviation of connec-
tion duration (σ_time) where communication windows
have smaller connection durations, entropy of source IP
address (S_srcip) - a few/single controller communi-
cating to bots, standard deviation of bytes (σ_bytes),
and packets (σ_packets) transferred in communication
during attacks. N_udp also plays a role as UDP is one
of the preferred modes of communication in IRC.
In DDoS attack scenario, the models rely on identi-
fying the windows where communication exists desti-
nation ports ≥ 1024 (N_dports>1024). Also, in DDoS
based attacks the number of ICMP based flows in-
creases as identified by the N_icmp feature importance.
Standard deviation of flow duration (σ_time) - short
flows for DDoS, amount of source bytes transferred
(N_srcbytes), number of source ports greater than 1024
(N_sports>1024), mean duration of flows (W¯_duration)
, and standard deviation of packets (σ_packets) - bytes
(σ_bytes) play key roles in identifying attack windows.
The analysis suggests the models can perform accurate
detection of the attack/communication windows with
limited number of features (in comparison to the pre-
viously identified 45 features), which be used to store
lower number of variables thereby considerably decreas-
ing the size of the feature set, and in turn reducing the
complexity of the machine learned models.
VI. Conclusion
We analyzed the capabilities and limitations of two
key machine learning models in their ability to detect
attacks in performed over network communication. Us-
ing Big Data approaches to develop features (from large
datasets) and train - test machine learning models, we
were able to identify operating characteristics of the
learned models in real-world scenario. Our analysis of the
models found feature engineering to be a key contributor
to improving machine learning models, where the biggest
increase in model accuracy resulted from changes in
window sizes. Exploration of hyper-parameters related
to the model did not show any significant increase both
Random Forest and MLP models. Comparing the models
itself, we observe Random Forest is capable of operating
at near perfect accuracy in detecting different types of
botnet attacks/communication when compared to MLP
models. The limitation of annotated data plays a key
role in the lower performance of MLP models, so in sce-
narios where there is availability of large annotated data
(using honey-pots, subject matter expert, detection over
time) MLP based models could potentially be effective.
However, in scenarios where there is limited availability
of such annotated data, Random Forest models will
outperform their counterparts.
The study also observed multiple aggregation windows
sizes perform the best for different types of attacks.
While this is negates the utilization of a generalized
model, in case of resource constraints (space and perfor-
mance issues related to multiple datasets and models),
a generalized dataset using 0.01 second aggregation can
be used with best performance in DDoS attacks, and
negligible degradation in accuracy for SPAM and IRC.
In order to further solve the dataset / model complexity,
lower number of features can also be used for model
training as identified by out feature importance analysis.
Future efforts include analyzing the performance of
models when we have unlabeled background traffic
and/or highly imbalanced data. We also plan to evaluate
of other types of attacks/communication such as peer-
to-peer, click-fraud, and other botnet/malware related
network data, and use the metrics for comparison to
standard detection tools (such as Bot-Sniffer [10]).
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